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ABSTRACT 
  
This study investigates how the capital market response to a variety of earnings 
management tools i.e., accrual-based earnings management, real transaction activities, and 
strategic revenue recognition. We measure the market response to the information content of 
earnings by the earnings response coefficient (ERC). By using pooled-OLS regression from 
748 firm-years data of public listed companies on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) in 
2004-2009, we find some evidence of a negative association between earnings response 
coefficients and information content of earnings that contained earnings management. Our 
study find that real transactions earnings management in operating activities has negative 
association with earnings response coefficient, but we do not find any evidence from the other 
earnings management tools. The findings of this study imply that the market participants 
are able to capture a certain kind of earnings management behaviour that may reduce the 
earnings response coefficient. 
 
Keywords:  Real transaction activities; accrual earnings management; strategic revenue 
recognition 
 
 
ABSTRAK 
 
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui bagaimana respon pasar terhadap berbagai 
cara dalam melakukan manajemen laba seperti manajemen laba berbasis akrual, mana-
jemen laba melalui aktivitas riil dan manajemen laba melalui strategi pengakuan 
pendapatan. Respon pasar terhadap kandungan informasi laba diukur dengan earning 
response coefficient (ERC). Data diolah menggunakan pooled-OLS untuk 748 pengamatan 
yang berasal dari perusahaan-perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) 
selama perioe 2004-2009. Hasil pengujian menunjukkan adanya hubungan negatif antara 
earning response coefficients dan kandungan informasi laba yang mengandung manajemen 
laba. Penelitian ini juga menemukan bahwa manajemen laba melalui transaksi riil atas 
aktivitas operasi memiliki hubungan negatif dengan earning response coefficient, namun 
tidak ditemukan bukti untuk manajemen laba dengan cara yang lain. Temuan penelitian ini 
mengindikasikan bahwa pelaku pasar mampu menangkap perilaku menajemen laba tertentu 
yang berkemungkinan menurunkan earning response coefficient. 
 
Kata kunci:  Aktivitas transaksi riil; pengeloaan laba akrual; strategi pengakuan 
pendapatan 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Previous studies documented various ear-
nings management tools used by public companies 
to meet earnings targets (Graham, Harvey, and 
Rajgopal 2005; Cohen, Dye and Lys 2008; 2005; 
Lin, Radhakrishnan, and Su 2006). Further re-
search found that public companies began to 
______________________________________ 
1 This paper has been presented at The 5th International Accounting Conference and 2nd Accounting Students Research Forum (IACSF), 
Nov. 24, 2014, Depok, Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia 
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switch from accrual-based earnings management 
to real earnings management in order to avoid 
auditor's findings (e.g., Graham et al. 2005). They 
also found that these real activities, including 
strategic revenue recognition in the form of accrued 
revenue and deferred revenue are used as a 
substitute for the accrual earnings management to 
meet earnings targets (Graham et al. 2005; Caylor 
2010; Burnett, Cripe, Martin, and McAllister 
2012). 
Earnings management can reduce earnings 
quality and thus negatively impact the investor 
decision-making (Levitt 1998). The increasing 
earnings management behavior over time on the 
other hand will also gave impact to the decreasing 
of earnings information content measured by 
earnings response coefficients (ERC) (Dechow and 
Schrand 2004; Defond and Park 2001; Kothari 
2001; Cohen et al. 2005). 
If the market suspects earnings management 
in the reported earnings of public companies, ERC 
will be lower. Empirical studies support of the 
negative association between earnings manage-
ment and the response of the market to earnings 
(Cohen et al. 2005; Lin and Shih 2006). Lin and 
Shih (2006) for example found that ERC for such 
firms that contain earnings management to 
achieve the earnings target is lower compared to a 
control group. 
Our research is motivated with the problem 
whether investors in the Indonesian Capital Mar-
ket (IDX) can detect various tools of earnings 
management, such as real earnings management 
in operating activities and strategic revenue recog-
nition. Previous studies on earnings management 
in Indonesia were mostly done using the trade-
tional concept of earnings management, i.e., 
accrual-based earnings management while curren-
tly real earnings management has been used in 
business practices (e.g., Challen and Siregar 2011; 
Ratmono 2010; Herusetya 2012; Pujilestari and 
Herusetya 2013). This study investigates the 
association of various tools of earnings manage-
ment used by the public companies in the Indo-
nesia Stock Exchange with the market’s reaction 
measured by the ERC. Specifically, this study 
examines the possibility of a negative association of 
accrual earnings management and real transact-
tions, both in operational activities and strategic 
revenue recognition2 to the ERC. 
Further discussions in this study are as 
follows: Section II discusses literature review and 
hypotheses development. Section III discusses the 
research methodology. Section IV discusses the 
                                                 
2 Caylor (2010) uses the term strategic revenue recognition as 
one of the tools in real earnings management activities. 
findings of the test, and Section V is the conclu-
sions, implications and suggestions for further 
research. 
 
Information Content of Earnings and 
Earnings Response Coefficients 
 
Earnings provide information to investors. 
And previous studies have tested the association 
between stock returns and earnings at least since 
the publication of Ball and Brown (1968). Previous 
research provides a variety of approaches to test 
the market’s reaction to the information content of 
earnings, among others using the earnings res-
ponse coefficient/ERC (Dechow and Schrand 2004). 
Investors can determine whether the information 
content of earnings has value relevance or not 
using the ERC, because “ERC captures the mar-
ginal effect of a dollar of earnings on the price” 
(Ronen and Yaari 2008). 
 
Accrual Earnings Management and Earnings 
Response Coefficient 
 
Many companies have taken advantage of the 
flexibility in accounting policies that are allowed in 
the standard of reporting by doing earnings mana-
gement using accruals for the purpose of reporting 
earnings (Healy and Wahlen 1999, Fields, Lys, and 
Vincent 2001). Accruals give an opportunity for 
managers to manage earnings, because managers 
need forecasts, estimates, and judgments3 (Dechow 
and Schrand 2004). The greater the level of discre-
tion in accruals, the greater the opportunity for 
managers to manage earnings (Dechow, Sloan, and 
Sweeney 1995; Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and 
Tuna 2003). Such earnings manipulations through 
the high discretionary accruals were found by 
Healy (1985) and Jones (1991). The existence of 
this earnings management will then reduce the 
earnings quality, and could reduce the investors’ 
confidence in reported earnings (Levitt 1998; 
Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson 2002). 
Earnings response coefficient measures how 
much investors react to the information content of 
earnings conveyed through the earnings surprise. 
Previous studies have found that earnings mana-
gement as an indication of lower earnings quality 
can be detected by the market through the ERC. 
Imhoff (1992) found that companies with a higher 
ranking position in a particular industry have a 
higher ERC (Dechow and Schrand 2004). Dechow 
and Park (2001) concluded that investors assume 
that higher accrual rate is an indication of lower 
                                                 
3 For example, managers can determine for themselves how 
much allowance for doubtful accounts, product warranty costs, 
allowance for inventory obsolescence, and so on. 
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earnings quality, and hence the investors give a 
lower response to earnings. Elliot and Hanna 
(1996) found lower ERC for each dollar of quarterly 
core earnings for the companies that record large, 
unusual and non-recurring charges compared to 
the companies that do not record the charges. With 
the above arguments, it is suspected there is a 
negative association between accrual earnings 
management and ERC, and thus our hypothesis is: 
H1: Reported earnings that contains accrual 
earnings management has a negative asso-
ciation with earnings response coefficient. 
 
Real Earnings Management in Operating 
Activities and Earnings Response Coefficient 
 
Previous studies documented other tools of 
earnings management such as real earnings mana-
gement (Graham et al. 2005; Roychowdhury 2006; 
Herusetya 2012, Burnett et al. 2012). Cohen et al. 
(2008) found that after the passage of the SOX Act 
in the United States, the trend of real transaction-
based earnings management is increasing, while 
accrual-based earnings management is decreasing. 
This is because in auditing financial statements, 
external auditors are more difficult to detect real 
transactions compared to accrual-based earnings 
management (Burnett et al. 2012; Graham et al. 
2005). In addition, managers have limited flexi-
bility in accruals manipulation if accruals have 
been done in the previous years (Barton and Simko 
2002). Real earnings management behavior had 
also been found in Indonesia (Herusetya 2012; 
Challen and Siregar 2011; Ratmono 2010). 
Past research has documented that real 
earnings management in operating activities can 
be done in the form of doing excessive production, 
increasing sales by giving discounts and relaxing 
the credit requirements, delaying the operating 
expenses, as well as the combination of all of them 
(Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Roychowdhury 2006). If 
accrual earnings management reduces earnings 
quality, the real earnings management in the 
operating activities will also reduce the earnings 
quality, and is predicted to have a negative 
association with earnings response coefficient too. 
Based on the above arguments, our hypothesis to 
be tested is: 
H2: Reported earnings that contains real earnings 
management in operating activities has a 
negative association with earnings response 
coefficient. 
 
Strategic Revenue Recognition and Earnings 
Response Coefficient  
 
The structure and the change over time of the 
real activities can be done through the strategic 
revenue recognition in accrued revenue and 
deferred revenue, as found by Caylor (2010). Caylor 
(2010) found that managers manipulate deferred 
revenue and accounts receivable to avoid negative 
earnings surprises, but found little evidence of 
managers to avoid losses or earning decreases. He 
found that managers perform manipulation of 
gross accounts receivable by providing an attract-
tive credit policy, easier credit eligibility require-
ments, as well as speeding delivery of goods. In 
addition, managers also perform earnings mana-
gement in deferred revenue using manipulation in 
accounting estimates through changes in contrac-
tual agreements with customers in order to 
accelerate the recognition of receivables. 
There is no previous study that examines the 
market’s reaction to the information content of 
earnings, if the financial statements contain 
earnings management in strategic revenue recog-
nition. Because of this strategic revenue recogni-
tion is one of the tools that managers could used, 
we expect that market has the ability to detect this 
kind of earnings management which is reflected in 
the reduced earnings response coefficient. Based on 
the above arguments, our hypothesis to be tested 
is: 
H3:  Reported earnings that contains real earnings 
management in strategic revenue recognition 
has a negative association with earnings res-
ponse coefficients 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Data and Sample Selection 
 
Financial data is extracted from the financial 
statements of non-financial public listed companies 
in the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) from 2004-
2009. The method of sample selection is purposive. 
We also exclude firms that are merging, listing and 
delisting throughout the observation period. Based 
on the selection criteria of the samples, we have 
156 same companies in each year during the period 
2004-2009 or 936 firm-years of observation4. 
However, after deducting the outliers with the 
amount of 189 firm-years data, we finally have 748 
firm-years data as a sample. The description of 
sample selection can be seen in Table 1. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Most of the research sample includes manufacturing firms 
(basic and industrial chemicals, industrial consumer goods, and 
miscellaneous industry) amounted to 58.33% of the existing 
number of samples, followed by trading companies, services 
and investments amounted to 29.49%, and the rest is property 
and real estate industry for 12.18%. 
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Table 1. Empirical Test Result of Hypothesis 1 
Model 1 
CARit = α0 + α1 UEit + α2 UE*ABSDACit +  α3 UE*LEVit + 
α4 UE*LOSSit  + α5 UE*SIZEit + α6 UE*BIG4it + α7 
UE*SGRit + α8 ABSDACit + α9 LEVit + α10 LOSSit  + 
α11SIZEit + α12 BIG4it + α13 SGR it  + εit 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: CAR 
Pre-
diction 
Coeffi-
cient 
t-sta-
tistic Sig. VIF 
Constant ?  0.344 1.786 0.075   
UE + -0.172 -0.944 0.345 20.541 
UE*ABSDA
C - -0.148 -0.572 0.568 2.689 
UE*LEV - 0.019 0.185 0.853 4.542 
UE*LOSS - -0.421*** -3.279 0.001 2.287 
UE*SIZE - 0.035** 1.999 0.046 21.643 
UE*BIG4 + -0.122 -1.014 0.311 1.549 
UE*SGR + -0.032* -1.691 0.091 1.782 
ABSDAC - 0.012 0.271 0.787 3.682 
LEV - 0.013 1.000 0.318 2.688 
LOSS - -0.085 -1.692 0.091 1.127 
SIZE - -0.028 -1.900 0.058 1.315 
BIG4 + -0.118 -2.599 0.010 1.197 
SGR + 0.021 3.814 0.000 1.677 
Adjusted R-
Square   0.056       
F-value   4.418       
Sig.   0.000       
n  748    
***, **, * indicate significant correlation at 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10, respectively (two-tailed test), except mentioned with 
one-tailed test. t-statistics are calculated using the 
Huber-White procedure to correct for heteroscedasticity 
probelem (Rogers, 1993). Multicollinearity problems due 
to the interaction variables are solved using centering 
procedure (Aiken dan West, 1991).  All variables are 
defined as in Table 2. 
 
Empirical Model 
 
Accrual Earnings Management and Ear-
nings Response Coefficient  
 
This study develops a cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) model used by Ghosh and Moon 
(2005), and Herusetya (2012). Our empirical model 
to test the hypothesis H1 is as follows: 
CARit = α0 + α1UEit + α2UE*ABSDACit +  α3UE* 
LEVit + α4UE*LOSSit + α5UE*SIZEit + 
α6UE*BIG4it + α7UE*SGRit + α8ABSDACit 
+ α9LEVit + α10LOSSit + α11SIZEit + 
α12BIG4it + α13SGRit + εit………………… 
(Model 1) 
 
In Model 1, our main variable of concern is 
UE*ABSDAC. The association between accrual 
earnings management and earnings response 
coefficient (ERC) is predicted negative and signi-
ficant, i.e. coefficient of α2. This implies that the 
market react negatively to the accrual earnings 
management measured by the discretionary 
accrual. 
Table 2. Variabel Descriptions 
Model 1- 3, and Equation (7):  
CAR = Cumulative abnormal return of firm i for 
12 months period, ending in 3 months of 
the end of fiscal year 
UE = Unexpected earnings, calculated by the 
formula:      
             
     
 
Where: EPS is earnings per share, and P 
is price of the company's stock 
ABSDAC = Absolute discretionary accruals deflated 
by lag total assets, computed using 
Kothari et al. (2005) model 
REM = Real earnings management at agregate 
level, computed using Cohen et al. (2008) 
and Roychowdhury (2006). 
SSRN = Real earnings management in strategic 
revenue recognition computed using 
Caylor (2010) model. 
Control Variables - Model 1-3: 
LEV = Leverage ratio, defined as total liabilities 
divided by total assets at the end year t 
LOSS = Dummy variable for loss firm, 1 if firm i 
at year t report net loss, 0 otherwise 
SIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets 
BIG4 = Dummy variable, 1 if the firm i is audited 
by Big 4, 0 otherwise 
SGR = Sales/revenues  growth, defined as (sales 
t – sales t-1)/sales t-1 
Equation (1) – (6): 
TACC = Total accruals, defined as earnings before 
extraordinary items less cash flow from 
operation 
A = Total assets 
∆REV = Change in firm’s net revenue in year t 
∆AR = Change in firm’s account receivables in 
year t 
PPE = Property, plant and equipment 
ROA = Firm’s return on assets, defined as the 
ratio of net earnings deflated by total 
assets 
CFO = Cash flow from operations 
Sales = Net sales 
∆Sales = Change in firm’s  net sales in year t 
Prod = The sum of cost of goods sold and change 
in inventory in year t 
DisExp = The sum of  Sales Expense, and General 
and Administration Expense (SG & A 
expenses) 
∆Gross AR = Change in gross account receivables  
∆Def Rev = Change in deferred revenue in short term 
period 
∆S = Change in firm’s  net sales in year t 
∆CFO = Change in cash flow from operations 
(CFO) in year t 
εit = Residual errors 
Subscript i,t = Identification for firm i and year t 
 
Real Earnings Management in Operating 
Activities and Earnings Response Coefficient 
 
Empirical model that represent the testing of 
hypothesis H2 is as follows: 
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CARit =  β0 + β1UEit + β2UE*REMit + β3UE*LEVit + 
β4UE*LOSSit + β5UE*SIZEit + β6UE*BIG4it 
+ β7UE*SGRit + β8REMit + β9LEVit + 
β10LOSSit + β11SIZEit + β12BIG4it + β13 SGR 
it+ εit……………….. (Model 2) 
 
The main variable in Model 2 is UE*REM. 
Coefficient of β2 is predicted negative and signi-
ficant, which shows the negative association of real 
earnings management in operating activities and 
earnings response coefficients. This implies that 
the market react negatively to the real earnings 
management in operating activities at the aggre-
gate level. 
 
Real Earnings Management in Strategic 
Revenue Recognition and Earnings Response 
Coefficient 
 
Empirical model that represent the testing of 
hypothesis H3 is as follows: 
CARit = φ0 + φ1UEit + φ2UE*SRRNit + φ3UE*LEVit 
+ φ4UE*LOSSit + φ5UE*SIZEit + φ6UE* 
BIG4it + φ7UE*SGRit + φ8SRRNit + φ9LEVit 
+ φ10LOSSit + φ11SIZEit + φ12BIG4it + φ13 
SGR it + εit……………… (Model 3)  
 
The main variables in Model 3 is UE*SRRN. 
Coefficient of φ2 is predicted negative and signi-
ficant, which implies that the market react nega-
tively to earnings management in strategic re-
venue recognition at the aggregate level, including 
the abnormal changes in accounts receivable and 
deferred revenue.  
 
Operationalization of Research Variables  
 
Accrual Earnings Management (ABSDAC)  
 
This study uses the accrual model developed 
by Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) to estimate 
the magnitude of discretionary accruals as follows: 
TACCit/Ait-1 = α0 + αi [1/Ait-1] + β1i [ΔREVit- ΔAR/Ait-1] 
+ β2i [PPEit/Ait-1] + δ1ROAi, t-1 + εit  (1) 
The variable definitions can be seen in Table 
2. The value of discretionary accruals (DA) or 
abnormal discretionary residual error (ε)5 of the 
regression equation (1), i.e., the difference of total 
accruals and fitted value of equation (1) is defined 
as DAit = (TACCit)-NDAit. The absolute value of 
discretionnary accruals (ABSDAC) is used as a 
proxy of accrual earnings management, whether it 
is positive or negative throughout the period, 
because both signs are seen as a form of earnings 
management (Cohen et al. 2008). 
                                                 
5 The residual error for equation (1) is obtained from the OLS 
regression conducted cross-sectionally for each year in each 
industry using Stata sofware version 11. 
Real Earnings Management in Operating 
Activities (REM)  
 
This study uses model of real earnings mana-
gement in operating activities applied by Roy-
chowdhury (2006) and Cohen et al. (2008) to 
calculate the magnitude of real transactions at the 
individual level, i.e., abnormal operating cash flow 
(ABCFO), abnormal production costs (ABPROD), 
and abnormal discretionary expenses (ABDI-
SEXP). To determine the normal level of variable 
operating cash flow (CFO), discretionary expenses, 
and production costs, we use model of Dechow, 
Kothari, and Watts (1998). We obtain the ab-
normal levels of each level using the difference 
between actual value of each variable and its fitted 
value from the OLS equation6.  
To reflect the influence of real transactions at 
the aggregate level, we use REM variable because 
each variable has its implications for the different 
level of earnings. REM is the sum of the stan-
dardized values of ABCFO, ABPROD, and 
ABDISEXP7. Real transaction earnings mana-
gement is present if the sign of REM is positive 
(Cohen and Zarowin 2010). 
 
Abnormal Operating Cash Flow (ABCFO)  
 
Normal operating cash flow (CFO) is a linear 
function of sales and change in sales, and can be 
determined using the regression equation (2) as 
follows: 
CFOit/Ait-1 =  kit[1/Ait-1] + k2[Sales/Ait-1] + k3[Δ 
Salesit/Ait-1] + εit (2) 
Variable definitions can be seen in Table 2. 
Based on equation (2), we can calculate the 
abnormal operating cash flow (ABCFO), i.e., the 
difference between actual operating cash flow and 
its fitted value of the normal operating cash flow 
from the equation (2), or we can use the standard 
errors (e) of the regression equation (2)8.  
 
Abnormal Production Costs (ABPROD)  
 
Cost of production is the sum of cost of goods 
sold and changes in inventory (Cohen et al. 2008), 
                                                 
6 Each specification using OLS regression models conducted 
cross-sectionally for each year in each industry using Stata 
software version 11. 
7 Following Chi, Lisic, and Pevzner (2011), the standardized 
values for each variable in each year of observation can be 
calculated using the formula, for example ABCFO = (variable 
ABCFO - mean ABCFO)/standard deviation ABCFO. Thus 
REM =  ˗(standardized value of ABCFO) + (standardized value 
of ABPROD) - (value standardized of ABDISEXP). 
8 Regression was performed for each industry per each year to 
control the different characteristics in each industry with the 
minimum number of observations per industry is 15 companies 
(Gul, Fung, and Jaggi 2009; Roychowdhury 2006). 
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so the estimated coefficients of normal level of 
production costs can be obtain using equation (3) as 
follows: 
Prodit/Ait-1 = k1t[1/Ait-1] + [k2Salesit/Ait-1] + k3[ΔSalesit/ 
Ait-1] + k4 [ΔSalesi,t-1/Ait-1] + εit (3) 
Based on the equation (3) we obtain the 
abnormal level of production costs (ABPROD), i.e., 
the difference between the actual production costs 
and its fitted value of the estimated coefficients 
from the equation (3). 
 
Abnormal Discretionary Operating Costs (ABDI-
SEXP)  
 
To find the normal level of discretionary 
expense (operating costs), we use the following 
equation: 
DisExpit/Ait-1 = k1t[1/Ait-1] + [k2 Sales i,t-1 /Ait-1] + εit  (4) 
The amount of abnormal discretionary operat-
ing costs (ABDISEXP) can be obtained from the 
actual value of discretionary operating costs minus 
fitted value of the estimated coefficient of the 
normal level of discretionary operating costs from 
equation (4). 
 
Strategic Revenue Recognition (SRRN) 
 
We use Caylor (2010) model to calculate the 
amount of strategic revenue recognition by 
identifying the abnormal changes in gross accounts 
receivable and deferred revenue. Because both 
magnitudes is a manipulation of revenue recog-
nition and have implications to the earnings, and 
to reflect the overall strategic manipulation of 
revenue recognition, we use the aggregate level of 
variable (SRRN), i.e., + (SSRA standardized value) 
+ (value SRRD standardized)9. We suspect that 
managers conduct earnings management in stra-
tegic revenue recognition if the value of SSRN is 
positive. 
 
Abnormal Accruals Revenue Recognition (SSRA)  
 
Following Caylor (2010), changes in abnormal 
gross accounts receivable (SRRA) is calculated as 
follows: 
ΔGross ARt/At-1 =  α0 + α1(1/At-1) + β1(ΔSt/At-1) + 
β2(ΔCFOt  + 1/At-1) + εt (5) 
SRRA is the difference between changes of 
actual gross accounts receivable and its predicted 
                                                 
9 Using the analogy of the aggregate value of real earnings 
management in operating activities, the standardized value of 
the SSRA and SSRD for each year can be calculated using the 
formula, for example, SSRA = (variable SSRA - mean 
SSRA)/standard deviation of SSRA. 
normal value. Abnormal changes in gross trade 
receivables increased when the actual value is 
greater than the predicted value. Based on equa-
tion (5) we can calculate the abnormal changes in 
gross accounts receivable, i.e. the standard error (ε) 
of the regression equation (5). On the basis of these 
arguments, managers are suspected to conduct 
real earnings management in strategic revenue 
recognition when the standard error (ε) is positive. 
 
Abnormal Deferred Revenue Recognition (SSRA)  
 
Following Caylor (2010), abnormal changes in 
deferred revenue (SRRD) can be calculated by the 
following regression equation: 
ΔDef Revt/At-1 = α0 + α1(1/At-1) + β1(ΔSt+1/At-1) + β2(Δ 
CFOt/At-1) + εt  (6) 
Based on the equation (6) we can calculate 
SSRD value, i.e., the standard error (ε) of regres-
sion equation (6). Abnormal changes in deferred 
revenue recognition occur when the actual change 
in the deferred revenue is greater than the 
estimated value. On the basis of these arguments, 
managers are suspected to conduct real earnings 
management in deferred strategic revenue recog-
nition when the standard error (ε) is positive 
(Pujilestari and Herusetya 2013).  
 
Earnings Response Coefficient (ERC)  
 
Following Hermawan (2009), the measure-
ment of cumulative abnormal return (CAR) as a 
dependent variable is calculated using the cumuli-
tive market adjusted returns. Abnormal return is 
the the excess of actual return from the normal 
return. Monthly abnormal return is calculated 
from the difference between the return of firm’s 
shares i and the market’s return m, i.e. ARit = Rit - 
Rmt; whereas CAR is the sum of abnormal returns 
over the 12 months ending in three months after 
the end of the fiscal year. Here is the formula for 
obtaining the CAR: 
    
               
        
        
               
        
 
Where:  IHSI = individual stock price index, and 
IHSG = composite stock price index.  
 
While the earnings response coefficient is 
calculated using the following equation: 
CARit = α + δ UEit + εit (7) 
 UE variable is a variable to capture the 
earnings surprise measured with random walk 
model, i.e., Earnings per Share (EPS) in the 
current year minus previous year EPS (Herusetya 
2012; Hermawan 2009). The coefficient δ is the 
earnings response coefficient (ERC). 
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Control Variables  
 
This study uses control variables in Model 1-3: 
(i) leverage (LEV); (ii) loss (LOSS); (iii) firm size 
(SIZE); (iv) Big 4 Firm (BIG4); and (v) sales growth 
(SGR).  
 SGR coefficient is predicted positive, because 
companies with high growth rates have higher 
ERCs than firms with lower growth rates (Scott 
2009). The coefficient of LEV and LOSS, each of it 
is predicted negative, as firms with higher debt 
levels and experiencing loss has a lower ERC (Scott 
2009; Dechow and Schrand 2004). SIZE is predict-
ted negative because larger companies have more 
information than smaller companies, so the mar-
ket’s reaction becomes smaller. Audit quality of Big 
4 is considered to have higher earnings quality 
than non-Big 4, so that BIG4 coefficient is predict-
ted positive (Balsam et al. 2003). Based on the 
above arguments, the coefficient interaction of 
UE*SGR, UE*BIG4 are predicted positive and 
significant, while the coefficient of UE*LOSS, 
UE*LEV, and UE*SIZE are predicted negative 
and significant. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations  
 
The results of descriptive statistics and corre-
lations of each variable in Model 1-3 after the 
process of winsorization are presented in Tables 3 
and 410. Mean of CAR of Model 1-3 (Table 3, Panel 
A, B, and C) are ranged from negative -0.077 to -
0.079, which indicates that the sample companies 
on average have negative abnormal return during 
the observation period 2004-2009. The mean of 
unexpected earnings (UE) is 0.010 and positive for 
all models, indicating that the sample firms on 
average reported an increase in earnings compared 
with the previous year. The mean of absolute 
discretionary accruals (ABSDAC) is 0.176 and 
positive (Table 3, Panel A), which indicates that the 
sample companies perform accrual earnings 
management by 17% of the total assets. The mean 
of real transaction earnings management at the 
                                                 
10 In order to avoid data that are outliers, we use winzorization 
procedures with 3 standard deviations of the mean for all 
continuous variables for each model (Acock 2008). Our classical 
assumption tests are made prior to the test of hypotheses which 
includes the test of data normality, multicollinearity test, and 
heteroscedasticity. Test of normality used the Kolmogorov-
Sminrnov test, the multicollinearity test used with the criteria of 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), and the heteroscedasticity tests 
used the White-heteroscedasticity method. To overcome the 
problems of multicollinearity, we use centering method for all 
continuous variables, i.e., the variable (x) - the mean of the 
variable (x) (Aiken and West 1991 in Kohler and Kreuter 2009). 
aggregate level (REM) is 0.045, indicating that the 
magnitude of real transaction in operating is 4.50% 
of total assets, while the mean of earnings mana-
gement in strategic revenue recognition (SSRN) is -
0.056 and negative, indicating that on average the 
public companies is reducing the magnitude of real 
transaction in revenue recognition, i.e., -5.60% of 
total assets. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics - Model 1-3 
Panel A. Model (n=748) 
Main Variable Mean 
Me-
dian 
Maxi-
mum 
Mini-
mum 
Std. 
Devia-
tion 
CAR -0.077 -0.227 -1.838 1.835 0.578 
UE 0.010 0.004 2.402 -2.364 0.510 
UE*ABSDAC -0.004 0.001 0.852 -1.251 0.130 
ABSDAC 0.176 0.085 18.463 0.000 0.868 
Panel B. Model 2 (n=748) 
CAR -0.079 -0.130 1.835 -1.838 0.575 
UE 0.010 0.004 2.402 -2.364 0.510 
UE*REM -0.006 0.000 3.499 -3.552 0.284 
REM 0.045 -0.031 34.824 -34.613 2.395 
Panel C. Model 3 (n=748) 
CAR -0.077 -0.129 1.835 -1.838 0.578 
UE 0.010 0.004 2.402 -2.364 0.510 
UE*SRRN -0.001 0.002 0.275 -0.268 0.062 
SRRN -0.056 -0.097 0.589 -0.689 0.187 
Panel D. Control Variable - Model 1-3 
LEV 0.613 0.543 8.575 0.000 0.561 
LOSS 0.250 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.433 
SIZE 13.409 13.262 18.223 8.520 1.619 
BIG4 0.430 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.495 
SGR 0.639 0.151 66.163 -2.418 4.791 
All variables are defined as in Table 2. Winzorization 
procedures are done using 3 deviation standards from 
the mean for all continuous data to avoid data outliers. 
 
Correlations among the operasional variables 
of Model 1-3 are presented in Table 4. ABSDAC in 
Model 1 (Table 4, Panel A) is negatively correlated 
with the UE at 0.05, implying that accrual 
earnings management has negative impact to the 
market’s reaction as shown by negative earnings 
response coefficients, consistent with our initial 
prediction. REM in Model 2 (Panel B) and SSRN in 
Model 3 (Panel C), each of which is not correlated 
with UE, despite each one has a negative sign. 
Some of the control variables in the models have 
negative and significant correlations with UE. UE 
consistently have a negative correlation to LOSS 
for each model (Panel A, B, C) at 0.01, consistent 
with the previous studies (Balsam, Krishnan, and 
Yang 2003; Scott 2009; Dechow and Schrand 
2004). LEV has a negative correlation with UE at 
0.01 for Models 2 and 3 (Panels B, C), but has no 
correlation with UE for Model 1 (Panel A). This 
correlation implies that the companies with high 
degree of leverage and reported loss would result to 
a negative earnings surprise (Scott 2009; Balsam et 
al. 2003). UE has no correlation to the other control 
variables such as SIZE, BIG4, and SGR for all 
models (Panels A, B, C). 
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Empirical Test of Hypothesis 1  
 
Testing result of Hypothesis 1 using Model 1 
(Table 5) has adjusted R-Square of 5.6% and F-
value of 4.418 at 0.01 (p = 0.000). Coefficient α2 
(UE*ABSDAC) has a value of -0.148, but not 
significant at 0.10 (t = -0.572). Thus we do not find 
evidence that the accrual earnings management 
gives a negative impact to the market as shown 
from the insignificant of the UE*ABSDAC coeffi-
cients. This implies that the capital market parti-
cipants cannot capture any accrual earnings mana-
gement undertaken by the company. Thus, hypo-
thesis H1 is rejected. 
 
Table 5. Empirical Test Result of Hypothesis 1 
Model 1 
CARit = α0 + α1 UEit + α2 UE*ABSDACit +  α3 UE*LEVit + 
α4 UE*LOSSit  + α5 UE*SIZEit  + α6 UE*BIG4it + α7 
UE*SGRit + α8 ABSDACit + α9 LEVit+ α10 LOSSit  + 
α11SIZEit + α12 BIG4it + α13 SGR it  + εit 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: CAR 
Predic-
tion 
Coeffi-
cient 
t-sta-
tistic 
Sig. VIF 
Constant ?  0.344 1.786 0.075   
UE + -0.172 -0.944 0.345 20.541 
UE*ABSDAC - -0.148 -0.572 0.568 2.689 
UE*LEV - 0.019 0.185 0.853 4.542 
UE*LOSS - -0.421*** -3.279 0.001 2.287 
UE*SIZE - 0.035** 1.999 0.046 21.643 
UE*BIG4 + -0.122 -1.014 0.311 1.549 
UE*SGR + -0.032* -1.691 0.091 1.782 
ABSDAC - 0.012 0.271 0.787 3.682 
LEV - 0.013 1.000 0.318 2.688 
LOSS - -0.085 -1.692 0.091 1.127 
SIZE - -0.028 -1.900 0.058 1.315 
BIG4 + -0.118 -2.599 0.010 1.197 
SGR + 0.021 3.814 0.000 1.677 
Adjusted R-
Square   0.056       
F-value   4.418       
Sig.   0.000       
n  748    
***, **, * indicate significant correlation at 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10, respectively (two-tailed test), except mentioned with 
one-tailed test. t-statistics are calculated using the Huber-
White procedure to correct for heteroscedasticity 
probelem (Rogers, 1993). Multicollinearity problems due 
to the interaction variables are solved using centering 
procedure (Aiken dan West, 1991).  All variables are 
defined as in Table 2. 
 
The testing results of control variables 
UE*LOSS (α4 = -0.421, t = -3.279) is negative and 
significant at 0.01 (Table 5), which imply that the 
companies with reported net loss will give a 
negative earnings surprise (Scott, 2009; Balsam et 
al., 2003). Variable UE*SIZE (α5 = 0.035, t = 1.999) 
is positive and significant at 0.05, in contrast with 
the previous studies (e.g. Balsam et al. 2003). 
Variable UE*SGR (α7 = -0.032, t = -1.691) is nega-
tive and significant at 0.10, contrast with the pre-
vious results (e.g., Balsam et al. 2003; Scott 2009). 
While other control variables such as UE*LEV and 
UE*BIG4 have no correlation on ERC. 
 
Empirical Test of Hypothesis 2  
 
The result of Hypothesis 2 testing using 
Model 2 (Table 6) has adjusted R-square of 6.2% 
and F-value of 4,799 significant at 0.01 (p = 0.000). 
The results of this study indicate that α2 has a 
value of -0.111 (t = -1.526), not significant at 0.10 
with a two-tailed test, but significant in one-tailed 
test (critical value t-test = 1.28) at 0.10. This 
implies that market participants can capture the 
real earnings management at the aggregate level 
which gives a negative impact on the information 
content of earnings or gives result to a lower 
ERC.Thus the hypothesis H2 is accepted.  
 
Table 6. Empirical Test Result of Hypothesis 2 
Model 2 
CARit = β0 + β1 UEit + β2 UE*REMit + β3 UE*LEVit + β4 
UE*LOSSit + β5 UE*SIZEit + β6 UE*BIG4it + β7 
UE*SGRit + β8 REMit + β9 LEVit + β10 LOSSit + β11 SIZEit 
+ β12 BIG4it + β13 SGR it + εit 
Inde-
pendent 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: CAR 
Predic-
tion 
Coeffi-
cient 
t-sta-
tistic Sig VIF 
Constant ? 0.374 1.961 0.05   
UE + -0.181 -1.023 0.307 19.664 
UE*REM - -0.111* -1.526 0.127 1.026 
UE*LEV - -0.044 -0.441 0.659 4.127 
UE*LOSS - -0.410*** -3.254 0.001 2.236 
UE*SIZE - 0.039** 2.199 0.028 21.642 
UE*BIG4 + -0.172* -1.433 0.152 1.575 
UE*SGR + -0.029* -1.571 0.117 1.775 
REM - -0.024*** -2.755 0.006 1.014 
LEV - 0.036 0.885 0.376 1.257 
LOSS - -0.084 -1.639 0.102 1.189 
SIZE - -0.031 -2.166 0.031 1.279 
BIG4 + -0.117 -2.580 0.010 1.206 
SGR + 0.020 3.694 0.000 1.672 
Adjusted 
R-Square    0.062       
F-value   4.799       
Sig.   0.000       
n   748       
***, **, * indicate significant correlation at 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10, respectively (two-tailed test), except mentioned 
with one-tailed test. t-statistics are calculated using the 
Huber-White procedure to correct for heteroscedasticity 
probelem (Rogers, 1993). Multicollinearity problems due 
to the interaction variables are solved using centering 
procedure (Aiken dan West, 1991).  All variables are 
defined as in Table 2. 
 
The results of UE*LOSS testing as control 
variable (Table 6) find a negative and significant 
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coefficient (β4 = -0.410, t = -3.254) at 0.01, 
consistent with previous predictions. Other control 
variables, EU*SIZE (β5 = 0.039, t = 2.199) is 
positive at 0.05 contrast with predictions, 
UE*BIG4 (β6 = -0.172, t = -1.433), and UE*SGR 
(β7 = -0.029, t = -1.571) is negative respectively at 
0.10 with a one-tailed test (critical value t-test = 
1.28), different from the previous studies (Balsam 
et al. 2003; Scott 2009). While UE*LEV does not 
affect the ERC. 
 
Empirical Test of Hypothesis 3  
 
The result of Hypothesis 3 testing using 
Model 3 (Table 7) has adjusted R-square of 6.7% 
and F-value of 4.073, significant at 0.01 (p = 0.000). 
The main coefficient of α2 (UE*SRRN) has a value 
of 0.267 (t = 0.611), not significant at 0.10. The 
result of this test has not found evidence that 
strategic revenue recognition as an earnings 
management tools give a negative impact to the 
market. Thus, the hypothesis H3 is rejected. An 
alternative explanation to this could be that the 
public companies in Indonesia do not use strategic 
revenue recognition as an earnings management 
tool significantly, both in the recognition of accrued 
revenue and deferred revenue, so the market 
cannot capture this kind of earnings management 
behavior. 
 
Table 7. Empirical Test Result of Hypothesis 3 
Model 3 
CARit = φ0 + φ1 UEit + φ2 UE*SRRNit+ φ3 UE* LEVit + φ4 
UE*LOSSit + φ5 UE*SIZEit + φ6 UE*BIG4it + φ7 
UE*SGRit+  φ8 SRRNit + φ9 LEVit + φ10LOSSit + φSIZE11 it 
+ φ12 BIG4it + φ13 SGRit + εit 
Inde-
pendent 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: CAR 
Predic-
tion 
Coeffi-
cient 
t-sta-
tistic Sig VIF 
Constant ? 0.378 1.954 0.051   
UE + -0.161 -0.871 0.384 20.971 
UE*SRRN - 0.267 0.611 0.541 1.704 
UE*LEV - -0.047 -0.471 0.638 4.152 
UE*LOSS - -0.435*** -3.392 0.001 2.263 
UE*SIZE - 0.039** 2.166 0.031 21.961 
UE*BIG4 + -0.124 -1.034 0.301 1.547 
UE*SGR + -0.029* -1.556 0.120 1.776 
SRRN - -0.02 -0.182 0.856 1.037 
LEV - 0.032 0.777 0.438 1.255 
LOSS - -0.085 -1.633 0.103 1.192 
SIZE - -0.031 -2.141 0.033 1.281 
BIG4 + -0.117 -2.547 0.011 1.216 
SGR + 0.020 3.662 0.000 1.680 
Adjusted R-
Square   0.051       
F-value   4.073       
Sig.   0.000       
n   748       
***, **, * indicate significant correlation at 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10, respectively (two-tailed test). t-statistics are calcu-
lated using the Huber-White procedure to correct for 
heteroscedasticity probelem (Rogers, 1993). Multicolli-
nearity problems due to the interaction variables are 
solved using centering procedure (Aiken dan West, 1991).  
All variables are defined as in Table 2. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study examines how the market res-
ponse toward the various tool of opportunistic 
earnings management. Opportunistic earnings 
management is measured by accrual earnings 
management, real transactions in operating acti-
vities, and strategic revenue recognition. While the 
market’s reaction to the information content of 
earnings is measured by earnings response coeffi-
cients (ERC). Our final sample consists of 748 firm-
years observation from non-financial public listed 
companies in the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) 
from the period of 2004-2009. 
Using the pooled OLS regression, our study 
find evidence that real earnings management in 
operating activities has negative association with 
earnings response coefficients (ERC).This evidence 
implies that market react negatively toward the 
real earnings management. Our evidence gives 
also the interpretation that real earnings mana-
gement in operating activities aredone at the 
aggregate level, which consist of the activities in 
accelerating sales transactions, performing excess 
production, and/or manipulating the discretionary 
operating expenses (Rowchowdhury 2006). 
We do not find evidence that accrual earnings 
management and real transaction in strategic 
revenue recognition have negative impact to the 
market’s response measured by earnings response 
coefficients (ERC). Several alternative explanations 
for this are the accruals management may have 
been detected by the auditor, so that it becomes 
less relevant to the market participants. In 
addition, the role of capital market regulation to 
improve compliance with the financial reporting 
standards make real earnings management more 
easily detected by the market. 
Overall, this study find some evidence that 
the majority of the market participants in Indo-
nesia can capture the earnings management tools 
used by the public companies reflected in the 
decreasing earnings response coefficients (ERC). 
This study has limitations among others, i.e. the 
accrual model used is still a controversy among the 
previous researchers, because there is still no 
consensus which model is more reliable in esti-
mating discretionary accruals (Gul et al. 2009). 
Thus the result of this study is sensitive to the 
accrual models used. Previous studies have sugges-
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ted that the real transaction earnings management 
is not only limited to operating transactions, but 
can also be done in investing and financing 
activities, as well as other forms of activities (Xu, 
Taylor, and Dugan 2007; Burnett et al. 2012). 
Further studies are expected to examine the real 
transactions of investment and financing apart 
from the operational activities. Future studies are 
also expected to control the investors between 
sophisticated and not sophisticated investors. 
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